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Abstract
In a topos, the characteristic arrow of a diagonal is called “internal equality”. It is natural to
wonder if axiomatizing internal equality, through a “diagonal classi7er”, instead of the subobject
classi7er, would be enough in order to have a topos. We prove that the answer is no, but that
it becomes yes, if we add a single axiom, asking for the existence of a “description operator”,
which enables to “peek” the sole element of any singleton. In a linguistic conclusion, we explain
how this illuminates the role of sentences like “the unique x in A, such that : : :”, in ordinary
mathematical language. c© 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Prerequisites
We brie>y recall some fundamental facts concerning toposes.
Our notations for objects of categories are designed so that they are non-ambiguous.
For arrows, notations may be ambiguous, but become non-ambiguous as soon as a
notation for the source object is known. If f is the notation of some arrow, and if a
notation A of its source object is necessary in order to make f non-ambiguous, we
may write f (rel. A), instead of f. Similarily, if f and g are notations for two parallel
arrows (same source and same target), we may write f= g (rel. A), instead of f= g,
where A denotes the common source object of f and g. We denote by 1 :A → A the
identity arrow of any object, and by g ◦ f :A → C the composition of f :A → B and
g :B → C.
Recall that a category C is called cartesian if it is equiped with a terminal object 1,
and a “product” functor × :C × C→ C, right adjoint to the diagonal functor  :C→
C × C. The unique arrow from any object A to the terminal object 1 is denoted by
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∗ :A → 1. The equation ∗ ◦ f = ∗ is valid for all f, and we have 1 = ∗ (rel. 1). We
use the notations 	1 :A× B → A and 	2 :A× B → B, for the canonical projections of
the product (which form the co-unit of the adjunction), and 〈f; g〉 :X → A×B for the
unique arrow such that 	1 ◦ 〈f; g〉 = f and 	2 ◦ 〈f; g〉 = g. The notation f × g is a
shortcut for 〈f ◦ 	1; g ◦ 	2〉, and  a name for the diagonal arrow 〈1; 1〉 :A → A× A.
The equation 〈	1; 	2〉= 1 (rel: A× B) is also valid.
If furthermore, for any object B, the functor PB :C → C, de7ned on objects by
PB(A) = A× B, and on arrows f :A → A′ by PB(f) = f × 1 (rel: A× B), has a right
adjoint, then the category is called cartesian closed. This right adjoint is denoted (on
objects) by C → CB. The co-unit of the adjunction is called “evaluation” and is denoted
by ev :CB × B → C. To any arrow f :A × B → C corresponds by the adjunction an
arrow, called its “abstraction”, and denoted by B(f) :A → CB. It is the sole arrow
such that ev ◦ (B(f)× 1) = f. The equation B(ev ◦ (g× 1)) = g is also valid.
A “square”:
A
f−−−−−→ C
g












h
B −−−−−→
k
D
is called cartesian, if it is commutative, and if for any arrows ’ :X → B and  :X →
C, such that k ◦ ’= h ◦  , there exists a unique arrow  :X → A, such that g ◦ = ’
and f ◦ =  .
If f :A → B and  :E → B are two arrows with the same target, a pullback of 
along f, is an arrow f∗(), such that there is a cartesian square:
P −−−−−→ E
f∗()













A −−−−−→
f
B
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A monomorphism is an arrow which is left cancellable with respect to composi-
tion. It is easily veri7ed that a pullback of a monomorphism along any arrow is a
monomorphism (in any category).
Two monomorphisms m : S → A and m′ : S ′ → A with target A, are called equivalent,
if there is an isomorphism ’ : S → S ′ such that m′ ◦ ’ = m. Notice that it is enough
to ask for two arrows ’ : S → S ′ and  : S ′ → S such that m′ ◦’=m and m ◦  =m′,
in order to have m and m′ equivalent. A subobject of an object A, is an equivalence
class of monomorphisms m : S → A.
A subobject classi2er (or “universal monomorphism”) is an arrow 	 : 1 → , such
that for any object A, the correspondence f → f∗(	) (pullback of 	 along f) is a
bijection between arrows from A to , and subobjects of A. Notice that there is no
need to specify a particular pullback of 	, because any two pullbacks of 	 along
the same arrow, will give equivalent monomorphisms, hence the same subobject. The
same kind of argument shows that the correspondence A → Sub(A) is a functor, and
that the bijection C(A;) → Sub(A) described above is natural in A. From now on,
this bijection will be denoted by K. The source object of K(f) will be denoted by
KA(f), and K(f) itself will be denoted by J.
If there is a universal monomorphism, then for any monomorphism m :A → B, there
exists a unique arrow denoted m :B →  such that m is equivalent (as a monomor-
phism with target B) to the monomorphism ∗m(	). The arrow m is called the char-
acteristic arrow of m.
A topos is a cartesian closed category with pullbacks and a subobject classi7er. 1
There are many examples of toposes, among which is the category of sets. In this
category, the subobject classi7er is just any map from a singleton to a set with two ele-
ments. More generally, in any topos, the object  is to be understood as the “set of truth
values”, and arrows from some object A to  are to be understood as “predicates” on
A. In an arbitrary topos,  may have more than two elements (i.e. arrows from 1 to ).
In an arbitrary category, it is not true that a pullback of an epimorphism (a right can-
cellable arrow) is an epimorphism. However, it is true in a topos. To see it, 7rst prove
that the pullback functor f∗ has a right adjoint. This fact is part of the so-called “fun-
damental theorem of toposes” (see [1], or any reference book). As a consequence, f∗
commutes with colimits. But it is easy to see that an arrow A → B is an epimorphism
if and only if B is the colimit of the diagram B ← A → B.
The internal equality eq :A×A → , for an object A in a topos, is the characteristic
arrow of the diagonal arrow  :A → A× A. It must be understood as the predicate on
A× A, which tests the equality of its two arguments.
It is readily veri7ed that internal equality is equivalent to external equality. In other
words, that any two arrows f and g with the same source A and the same target B,
are equal if and only if the arrow eq ◦ 〈f; g〉 from A to  is equal to 	 ◦ ∗.
1 In fact there is no need to ask for all pullbacks. It is enough to ask for pullbacks of .
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We de7ne the arrows f ∧ g, f ⇒ g; ∀B(h) and ∃B(h) (all from A to ), for any
arrows f; g :A → , and h :A× B → , by
• f ∧ g= eq ◦ 〈〈f; g〉; 〈	 ◦ ∗;	 ◦ ∗〉〉,
• f ⇒ g= eq ◦ 〈f;f ∧ g〉,
• ∀B(h) = eq ◦ 〈B(h); B(	 ◦ ∗)〉,
• ∃B(h) = ∀((∀B(h ◦ (	1 × 1)⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1))⇒ 	2).
These de7nitions are not very mysterious, except perhaps the last one. However, it
is just the intuitionistic counter-part of the well-known classical equivalence between
∃x∈Bh[x] and ∀x∈Bh[x].
The following facts are immediate consequences of the de7nitions (for any arrow
’ :X → A):
• (f ∧ g) ◦ ’= (f ◦ ’) ∧ (g ◦ ’),
• (f ⇒ g) ◦ ’= (f ◦ ’)⇒ (g ◦ ’),
• ∀B(h) ◦ ’= ∀B(h ◦ (’× 1)),
• ∃B(h) ◦ ’= ∃B(h ◦ (’× 1)).
We now explain the so-called “Kripke–Joyal” semantics relative to the logical con-
nectors de7ned above.
Conjunction: It is clear, from the properties of internal equality, that f ∧ g=	 ◦ ∗ if
and only if f =	 ◦ ∗ and g=	 ◦ ∗.
Implication. f ⇒ g is equal to 	 ◦ ∗ if and only if for all ’ :X → A, such that
f ◦’=	◦∗, we have g ◦’=	◦∗. Indeed, if f ⇒ g=	◦∗, the arrows f and f∧g
are equal. If ’ :X → A is an arrow such that f◦’=	◦∗, we have (f∧g)◦’=	◦∗,
so that g ◦ ’=	 ◦ ∗.
Conversely, take for ’ :X → A a pullback of 	 along f. We have f ◦ ’ = 	 ◦ ∗,
so that g ◦’=	 ◦ ∗, and then (f ∧ g) ◦’=	 ◦ ∗. Let  :Y → A be a pullback of 	
along f ∧ g. We have (f ∧ g) ◦  =	 ◦ ∗, and a fortiori f ◦  =	 ◦ ∗. To prove that
f ⇒ g is 	 ◦ ∗, in other words, that f = f ∧ g, it is enough to prove that ’ and  
are equivalent monomorphisms. But the condition (f ∧ g) ◦ ’ = 	 ◦ ∗ implies that ’
lifts along  . Similarly, the condition f ◦  =	 ◦ ∗ implies that  lifts along ’. This
gives the wanted isomorphism together with its inverse.
Universal quantier. ∀B(h)=	◦∗ (rel: A) is obviously equivalent to h=	◦∗ (rel: A×B).
Existential quantier. ∃B(h) = 	 ◦ ∗ (rel: A) holds if and only if there exists an epi-
morphism e :X → A, and an arrow ’ :X → B, such that h ◦ 〈e; ’〉 = 	 ◦ ∗ (rel: X ).
We prove it below for the interested reader, because this fact will not be used in
the sequel. But right now, we give some intuitive explanations. A statement like ∃B(h)
may arise in any context. In our presentation, the role of the context is played by
the object A. This is why our statement is an arrow with source A. If there were no
context (more precisely an empty context), it would have been an arrow of source 1.
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Now the notion of “element” of X (where X is an object) also depends on the context.
An element of X in the context A is an arrow from A to X . Now, if e :X → Y is
an epimorphism, elements of Y in the context A do not necessarily have “antecedents”
in X , in the sense that an arrow A → Y may perhaps not lift along e, if A is not a
projective object. For this reason the intuitive “surjectivity” of epimorphisms does not
apply to elements as de7ned above, but to some much more abstract notion of element.
This new notion, even if not precisely de7ned, helps nevertheless to understand our
interpretation of the existential quanti7er. Indeed, according to it, our statement is true,
if and only if we have the following commutative diagram:
We understand it intuitively as follows (where “elements” are highly abstract ones).
For any values that the variables in the context may have, i.e., for any “element” x in A,
there is an “element” y of B (“lift” x along e, and go down along ’) such that h(x; y)
is true. In other words, it is the almost usual meaning of the existential quanti7er.
As an example, consider the topos of G-sets and G-equivariant maps, for some
non-trivial group G. Remark that G itself has no element (in the strong sense) relative
to the empty context (represented by the terminal object 1), because G acting on itself
has no 7xed point. Nevertheless, G is “non-empty”, because it is non-isomorphic to
the empty G-set (the initial object 0). So, G may have only abstract elements, and it
is indeed abstractly non-empty, as one may verify easily, by proving that ∃G(	◦ ∗) is
equal to 	 ◦ ∗. Of course, 1 is not projective in the topos of G-sets.
It is worth noticing that the universal quanti7er is not less strange than the existential
quanti7er. Indeed, the statement ∀G(⊥◦∗) (where ⊥, de7ned as ∀(	2), means “false”)
is not true in the topos of G-sets (provided that set theory is consistent). Indeed, if
it were equal to 	 ◦ ∗, we would have ⊥ ◦ ∗ = 	 ◦ ∗ (rel: 1 × G), which implies
that the topos of G-sets is degenerated (i.e. is a groupoid), and that set theory is
inconsistent. Nevertheless, it is true that for all elements in G, the statement ⊥ ◦ ∗ is
equal to 	 ◦ ∗, simply because there is no element in G. This gives a very simple
example of a universally quanti7ed statement which is not provable, but all of whose
particularizations are provable.
The question of projective objects in a topos is deeply linked to the axiom of
choice. 2 The interested reader may consult any reference book on toposes, for example
[2–4].
2 The choice has two non-equivalent forms: internal and external. The external axiom of choice says that all
objects are projective, while the internal axiom of choice says that all objects are internally projective, i.e.
that for any object A, and any epimorphism B→ C, the corresponding arrow BA → CA is an epimorphism.
The reader may easily verify that in the topos of G-sets, all objects are internally projective.
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Now, we prove the interpretation of the existential quanti7er. Suppose 7rst that the
epimorphism e and the arrow ’ exist, satisfying f ◦ 〈e; ’〉 = 	 ◦ ∗ (rel: X ). To show
that ∃B(h) =	 ◦ ∗ (rel: A), it is enough to prove that
(∀B(h ◦ (	1 × 1)⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1))⇒ 	2 =	 ◦ ∗ (rel: A× ):
To this end, it is enough, assuming that 〈u; v〉 :Y → A ×  is an arrow such that
(∀B(h ◦ (	1 × 1)⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1)) ◦ 〈u; v〉=	 ◦ ∗, to prove that 	2 ◦ 〈u; v〉=	 ◦ ∗, i.e. that
v=	 ◦ ∗ (rel: Y ).
Our new hypothesis is
h ◦ (	1 × 1) ◦ (〈u; v〉 × 1)⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1 ◦ (〈u; v〉 × 1) =	 ◦ ∗ (rel: (A× )× B):
The conclusion of the implication writes, after simpli7cation, v ◦ 	1, and the premise
simpli7es to h ◦ (u× 1).
Let  :P → Y × B be the pullback of 〈e; ’〉 along u× 1. In the diagram below, the
two squares are cartesian:
P −−−−−→ X
 












〈e;’〉
Y × B −−−−−→
u×1
A× B
	1












	1
Y −−−−−→
u
A
Since 	1 ◦ 〈e; ’〉 is equal to e, we see that 	1 ◦  is an epimorphism. But since
h◦〈e; ’〉=	◦∗, we have h◦(u×1)◦ =	◦∗, hence v◦	1◦ =	◦∗=	◦∗◦	1◦ (rel: P).
Now, 	1 ◦  being an epimorphism, we see that v=	 ◦ ∗.
Conversely, assume that ∃B(h) = 	 ◦ ∗ (rel: A). De7ne X = KA×B(h), e = 	1 ◦
J (rel: KA×B(h)) and ’ = 	2 ◦ J (rel: KA×B(h)). Then, we have J = 〈e; ’〉, hence
h ◦ 〈e; ’〉=	◦∗, and it remains to prove that e :KA×B(h)→ A is an epimorphism. Let
u and v be two arrows from A to some object Y , and assume that u ◦ e = v ◦ e. It is
enough to prove that u= v.
Our hypothesis is
(∀B(h ◦ (	1 × 1)⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1))⇒ 	2 =	 ◦ ∗ (rel: A× ):
Composing the premise of this implication on the right by 〈1; eq ◦ 〈u; v〉〉, and elimi-
nating the quanti7er, we get the formula
h ◦ (	1 × 1) ◦ (〈1; eq ◦ 〈u; v〉〉 × 1)⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1 ◦ (〈1; eq ◦ 〈u; v〉〉 × 1)
which becomes after simpli7cation
h ⇒ eq ◦ 〈u ◦ 	1; v ◦ 	1〉:
This last expression is equal to 	◦∗, because if  :Z → A×B is such that h◦=	◦∗,
 lifts as an arrow L along J, in other words, along 〈e; ’〉 :KA×B(h)→ A× B. Then,
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we have
u ◦ 	1 ◦ = u ◦ 	1 ◦ 〈e; ’〉 ◦ L
= u ◦ e ◦ L
= v ◦ e ◦ L
= v ◦ 	1 ◦ :
We see that 	2 ◦ 〈1; eq ◦ 〈u; v〉〉=	 ◦ ∗, which entails that u= v.
Of course, there is also a Kripke–Joyal semantics for the other connectors, which
are 	 (true), for which it is obvious, ∨ (or) and ⊥ (false), for which it is much less
obvious. The interested reader may consult any reference book on topos theory.
2. An alternative axiomatization of the subobject classier
As recalled above, the subobject classi7er , is characterized by the property that ar-
rows from A to  are in bijective correspondence with equivalence classes of monomor-
phisms with target A. More precisely, there is a bijection (for any object A):
C(A;)→ Sub(A);
where Sub(A) represents the set of subobjects of A.
We 7rst express these data and conditions in a more expanded form, as we already
did for the product and power functors. In this spirit, we ask for the following data:
• an object denoted , and an arrow 	 : 1→ ,
• for each object A a function mapping an arrow f :A →  to an arrow J :X → A.
The source X of this arrow, will from now on, be denoted by KA(f).
We must now express the fact that for any arrow f :A → , J :KA(f) → A is a
pullback of 	 along f, and that any monomorphism with target A is equivalent to a
J coming from a unique f. This is achieved by the following axioms:
• (1) For any arrow f :A → , we have f ◦J=	 ◦ ∗ (rel: KA(f)).
• (2) For any arrows f :A →  and ’ :X → A, such that f ◦ ’=	 ◦ ∗, there is an
arrow L’f :X → KA(f), such that J ◦ L’f = ’.
• (3) For any arrows f :A →  and  :X → KA(f), we have (J ◦  )f =  .
• (4) For any arrows f; g :A → , ’ :KA(f) → KA(g) and  :KA(g) → KA(f), such
that J ◦ ’=J and J ◦  =J, we have f = g.
• (5) For any monomorphism m :A → B, there exists an arrow m :B → , such that
m ◦ m=	 ◦ ∗.
• (6) For any monomorphism m :A → B, and any arrow ’ :X → B, such that m ◦
’=	 ◦ ∗, there exists an arrow ’mA :X → A, such that m ◦ ’mA = ’.
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Indeed, axiom (1) says that the square
KA(f)
∗−−−−−→ 1
J













A −−−−−→
f

is commutative. Axioms (2) and (3) say that it is furthermore cartesian (axiom (3)
providing the unicity of the arrow L’f, whose existence is asserted by axiom (2)).
As a consequence, J is a monomorphism, as a pullback of 	 (which is itself a
monomorphism, because 1 is terminal).
Axiom (4) says that if J :KA(f)→ A and J :KA(g)→ A are equivalent monomor-
phisms, then f = g, in other words, that our correspondence is injective.
Now, axioms (5) and (6) say that any monomorphism m : X → A is a pullback of
	, along some arrow denoted m, so that, up to equivalence of monomorphisms, it is
the same as the arrow J (rel. KA(m)). Notice that the unicity of the arrow ’mA is a
consequence of the fact that m is a monomorphism. In other words, these two axioms
say that our correspondence is surjective.
We want to keep axioms (1)–(4) (which do not use the notion of monomorphism),
but we would like to weaken axioms (5) and (6) (which do use that notion), by
restricting them to the sole diagonals. So, we replace them by
• (5) For any object A, there is an arrow eq : A× A → , such that eq ◦ =	 ◦ ∗.
• (6) For any arrows ’;  : X → A, such that eq ◦ 〈’;  〉=	 ◦ ∗, we have ’=  .
As we shall see, this is no longer enough to ensure that our category is a topos.
However, it becomes enough if we add the following “axiom of description”:
• (7) For any object A, there is an arrow ] : KA(∃A(eq ◦ (1 × A(eq)))) → A, such
that A(eq) ◦ ]=J.
As we shall see, the object KA(∃A(eq◦(1×A(eq)))) is just “the set of all singletons
in A”. So, the “function” ] is just some eMective way of extracting the single element
from a singleton.
We verify now that all toposes satisfy axioms (1)–(4),
(5), (6) and (7), the only non-trivial point being axiom (7).
To this end, we 7rst prove that (in a topos) for any monomorphism m :A → B,
the arrow ∃A(eq ◦ (1× m)) is the characteristic arrow of m. This result is classical in
topos theory, but for the convenience of the reader we give a complete proof, using
our particular notational conventions.
First, we show that ∃A(eq ◦ (1× m)) ◦ m=	 ◦ ∗. This amounts to proving that
(∀A(eq ◦ 〈m ◦ 	1 ◦ 	1; m ◦ 	2〉 ⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1))⇒ 	2 =	 ◦ ∗ (rel: A× ):
Let 〈u; v〉 :Y → A× be an arrow such that (∀A(eq ◦ 〈m ◦	1 ◦	1; m ◦	2〉 ⇒ 	2 ◦	1)) ◦
〈u; v〉 = 	 ◦ ∗. It is enough to prove that v = 	2 ◦ 〈u; v〉 = 	 ◦ ∗. Our new hypothesis
A. Proute / Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra 158 (2001) 295–307 303
is equivalent to
eq ◦ 〈m ◦ u ◦ 	1; m ◦ 	2〉 ⇒ v ◦ 	1 =	 ◦ ∗:
Composing on the right with 〈1; u〉 : Y → Y × A, we see that v=	 ◦ ∗.
Next, we show that if ’ : X → B is such that ∃A(eq ◦ (1 × m)) ◦ ’ = 	 ◦ ∗, then
’ lifts along m. In order to do that, it is enough to show that m ◦ ’ = 	 ◦ ∗. We
have
(∀A(eq ◦ 〈’ ◦ 	1 ◦ 	1; m ◦ 	2〉 ⇒ 	2 ◦ 	1))⇒ 	2 =	 ◦ ∗ (rel: X × ):
Composing on the right with 〈1; m ◦ ’〉, we get
(∀A(eq ◦ 〈’ ◦ 	1; m ◦ 	2〉 ⇒ m ◦ ’ ◦ 	1))⇒ m ◦ ’=	 ◦ ∗:
So, it is enough to prove that (∀A(eq ◦ 〈’ ◦ 	1; m ◦ 	2〉 ⇒ m ◦’ ◦ 	1)) =	◦ ∗. To this
end, let 〈#; $〉 :Y → X ×A, be such that eq ◦〈’◦	1; m◦	2〉◦ 〈#; $〉=	◦∗, and we just
have to prove that m ◦’ ◦ #=	◦ ∗. But the last hypothesis shows that ’ ◦ #=m ◦ $,
so that m ◦ ’ ◦ #= m ◦ m ◦ $ =	 ◦ ∗.
The arrow A(eq) : A → A, is known as the singleton arrow. Let us call it %.
It is an easy exercise to prove that it is a monomorphism, not only in a topos, but
even in any cartesian closed category equipped with an , and a K satisfying axioms
(1)–(4), (5) and (6).
Now, the arrow ∃A(eq ◦ (1×A(eq))) is just %, and the following two squares are
cartesian:
A
∗−−−−−→ 1
%













A −−−−−→
%

;
KA(%)
∗−−−−−→ 1
J













A −−−−−→
%

and must be isomorphic, hence the required arrow ], and axiom (7) is satis7ed.
3. Why our axioms are enough for a topos
We now prove that any cartesian closed category C, equipped with an  and a K
satisfying axioms (1)–(4), (5), (6) and (7), is a topos. The reader should be aware
that, even if some of the following proofs are well known for a topos, we are using
them for a category which is not yet known to be a topos.
K together with axioms (1)–(3) provide the correspondence which maps any arrow
f : A →  to a subobject of A. So, we only have to prove that this correspondence is
bijective. Axiom (4), clearly ensures that the correspondence is injective.
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Now, notice that axioms (5) and (6) ensure that the square
A
∗−−−−−→ 1














A× A −−−−−→
eq

is cartesian.
To prove that our correspondence is surjective, it is enough to prove that, for any
monomorphism m : A → B in C, there is an arrow m : B → , such that the following
square is cartesian:
A
∗−−−−−→ 1
m













B −−−−−→
m

because in that case, we have m=K(m) up to equivalence.
If f : A → B is an arrow of C, one may de7ne the arrow f−1 : B → A as
f−1 = A(eq ◦ (1× f)):
We claim that if m : A → B is a monomorphism, the following diagram is commu-
tative (this fact is obvious in the category of sets):
Indeed, consider the diagram
A
m−−−−−→ B ∗−−−−−→ 1





















A× A −−−−−→
m×m
B× B −−−−−→
eq

The right-hand square is cartesian as noticed above. If 〈’;  〉 : X → A × A and
 : X → B are arrows such that  ◦ = (m×m) ◦ 〈’;  〉, we have m ◦ ’= =m ◦  .
Since m is a monomorphism, we deduce that ’= , so that ◦’=〈’;  〉 and m◦’=,
and the left-hand square is cartesian.
As a consequence, the outer square is cartesian, and we have eq ◦ (m×m) = eq, by
axiom (4).
A. Proute / Journal of Pure and Applied Algebra 158 (2001) 295–307 305
Now, we have
%= A(eq) = A(eq ◦ (1× m) ◦ (m× 1)) = A(eq ◦ (1× m)) ◦ m= m−1 ◦ m:
Furthermore, the following square is cartesian:
A
1−−−−−→ A
m












%
B −−−−−→
m−1
A
Indeed, we already know that it is commutative. Suppose that ’ : X → B and
 : X → A are arrows, such that m−1 ◦ ’= % ◦  . Since m is a monomorphism, it is
enough to prove that ’= m ◦  .
From our hypothesis, we have A(eq ◦ ( × 1))=A(eq ◦ (’×m)). Eliminating the
A, and composing on the right by 〈1;  〉, yields eq ◦ 〈 ;  〉 as left member, in other
words 	 ◦ ∗, and eq ◦ 〈’;m ◦  〉 as right member, so that ’= m ◦  .
Finally, consider the diagram (m any monomorphism)
A
1−−−−−→ A ∗−−−−−→ 1
m












%







B −−−−−→
m−1
A −−−−−→
%

whose left-hand square is cartesian. By the axiom of description (7), the right-hand
square is cartesian, so that the outer square is also cartesian, and m has % ◦ m−1 as
its characteristic arrow.
4. The independance of the axiom of description
One may wonder if the description operator is really necessary, in our axiomatization,
in order to have a topos. The answer is yes, and we prove it by providing an example
of a cartesian closed category, which satis7es all our axioms, but not the axiom of
description (7). This example is surprisingly simple.
Indeed, it is enough to consider the ordered set {0; 1}. As a category, it is cartesian
closed, because it is a Heyting algebra (in fact a boolean algebra). In this category,
which has only two objects and three arrows, 1 is terminal, we have
0× 0 = 0; 1× 1 = 1; 10 = 11 = 1;
and the diagonal of any object is the identity of this object. Furthermore, all arrows
are monomorphisms.
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Now, 	 : 1→  must be the identity of 1. It is clear that the following two squares
are cartesian:
0 −−−−−→ 1












0 −−−−−→ 1
1 −−−−−→ 1












1 −−−−−→ 1
so that, each object has an internal equality. Also, the arrow 	 has a pullback along
any arrow whose target is 1. This shows that all our axioms, except perhaps (7), are
satis7ed.
That the axiom of description (7) is not satis7ed in this category, may be seen
by remarking that the monomorphism 0 → 1 has no characteristic arrow. Indeed, the
following square is not cartesian:
0 −−−−−→ 1












1 −−−−−→ 1
because there is no arrow from 1 to 0.
5. A linguistic conclusion
In ordinary mathematical language, we use notations for pairs, projections, functions
and application of functions to arguments, together with rules which allow interpre-
tations within cartesian closed categories. However, it is not clear how the language
manages the bijective correspondence between predicates on a given set and subsets
of this set.
Expressions of the mathematical language, which represent elements of a set A,
may be interpreted as arrows & → A, where & represents the “context” in which the
expression is found. More precisely, & is the product of all the types of the variables
declared in the context. Arrows from 1 to A arise only when the context is empty.
We 7rst have the “comprehension syntax”
{x ∈ A |E[x]}
which enables to construct a subset of A from a predicate E[x] on A. Clearly, if E[x] is
to be interpreted as an arrow f : A → , the subset {x ∈ A |E[x]} is to be interpreted
as the object KA(f), and we have a canonical inclusion from the subset into the whole
set, to be interpreted as J : KA(f)→ A. This corresponds to axiom (1).
Usually, as soon as we have proved that some element a of A has property E[x] (in
other words, we have proved E[a]), we are allowed to consider a as an element of
{x ∈ A |E[x]}, and we know that the image of this element by the canonical inclusion
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is the original a. This corresponds to axiom (2), where the object X plays the role of
the context. Axiom (3) ensures that the canonical inclusion is indeed injective.
If we have two predicates E[x] and F[x] de7ned on the set A, and if we want to
prove that these two predicates are logically equivalent, it is enough to prove that the
two subsets {x ∈ A |E[x]} and {x ∈ A |F[x]} of A are included in each other. This
corresponds to axiom (4).
Of course, we have a notion of equality, denoted a=b, between elements of a given
set A, and we know that for any element a of A, we have a= a. This corresponds to
axiom (5).
We also know that saying that two elements a and b of the set A are equal, is
equivalent to saying that the equality a= b is true. This fact is so obvious that it may
be unnoticed. This corresponds to axiom (6), where, again, the object X plays the
role of the context.
Finally, we often use sentences like: “the unique element of S” (where S is a sin-
gleton subset of some set A), or “the unique x in A such that E[x]”, when it is obvious
from the context, that the statement ∃!x∈A E[x] is true. This kind of sentence, enables
to extract the single element from a singleton. This clearly corresponds to axiom (7).
In other words, the above list of principles, from the usual mathematical practice,
is nothing else but an axiomatization of the subobject classi7er. The fact that the
description axiom is independant of other axioms, shows that sentences like “the unique
x in A, such that E[x]” are mandatory in a language based on these principles.
The correspondence between the mathematical language and topos theory has 7rst
been developed through the so-called Benabou–Mitchell language. It is possible to
design a language (including variables) using the principles suggested in this section
(with a description operator), and to describe a precise topos semantics (i.e. a compiler)
for it. However, such developments are beyond the scope of this paper.
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